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ENTERING THE INVISIBLE COLLEGE:
DEFEATING LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN TURF
By TANJA AALBERTS AND LIANNE J M BOER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The fifth volume of the Chilcot Report describes the development of the
legal advice provided by Lord Goldsmith to the British government on the
legality of the invasion in Iraq. It tracks his change of mind from the view
that UNSC Resolution 1441 did not authorise military action, to the
‘better view’1 that no further resolution was needed to authorise military
action. Some sixty pages into volume 5 of the Report, a remarkable ex-
change between Lord Goldsmith, Jack Straw and Sir Michael Wood is
described.2 It starts with a memo by Wood, who states there is ‘no doubt’
about the illegality of using force against Iraq, ‘without a further decision
of the [Security] Council, and absent extraordinary circumstances (of
which at present there is no sign)’.3 Five days later, and following a dis-
cussion with Wood on the subject,4 Straw responds in writing by saying,
‘I note your advice, but I do not accept it’.5 Both documents have been
* Tanja Aalberts is Professor of Law and Politics at the Department of Transnational Legal
Studies at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, and Director of the Centre for the Politics of
Transnational Law. Email t.e.aalberts@vu.nl. Dr LJM (Lianne) Boer is Assistant Professor of
Transnational Legal Studies at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, and Research Fellow of the Centre
for the Politics of Transnational Law. Email l.j.m.boer@vu.nl. All URLs are correct as of 30 June
2018.
1 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry (Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors), 6 July 2016, vol
5, Section 5, para 572. All sections of the Report are available at5http://webarchive.nationalarc-
hives.gov.uk/20171123122743/http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-report/4.
2 Ibid, paras 341–395.




4 Report, vol 5, Section 5, para 350.
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‘the subject of considerable interest by the Inquiry’,6 legal scholarship and
public debate alike. Most academic discussion focuses on the legal justi-
fication for going to war against Iraq and whether Straw knowingly acted
illegally.7 What we are interested in, instead, is how the legal advice by
both Sir Michael Wood (as Legal Adviser in the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office) and Lord Goldsmith (as Attorney General) is
refused or rather refuted by Jack Straw (as the Foreign Secretary) on
the basis of legal arguments. In other words, we are interested in how
lawyers are defeated on their own turf. We analyse this exchange of
memos against the background of the increasing legalisation of world pol-
itics, and consider what the Chilcot Inquiry reveals about the role and
importance of the legal adviser as well as (the production of) legal know-
ledge within foreign policy. More specifically, we position these exchanges
in the debate about the structural empowerment of legal advisers in the
policy-making process as a result of the expansion of international law and
the legalisation of international society. We argue that the exchange reveals
a more dynamic relationship between law and politics than the ‘lawyering
up’ argument suggests,8 as they demonstrate a simultaneous upgrading
and downgrading of legal expertise.
In our discussion of Straw’s arguments, we show, first, how his sub-
stantive rejection of Wood’s advice downgrades legal knowledge as a
specific kind of expertise: while Straw is, in his own words, ‘not, fam-
ously, an international lawyer’9, this does not preclude him from reject-
ing the legal advice given and engaging with and determining the
substance of the law, using lawyers’ own instruments. While ‘I note
your advice, but I do not accept it’ at face value seems a classic example
of politics (or a politician) trumping law (or a lawyer), Straw cannot
forego law altogether: he needs a legal justification to support his foreign
policy objectives. This in itself is not very surprising, given the broader
picture of the legalisation of world politics.10 What is more interesting is
that Straw uses legal arguments to make his point: he substantively en-
gages with those he disagrees with on questions of law, based on his own
involvement in the negotiations of Resolution 1441. As a second mani-
festation of the law/politics interplay, we show how Straw’s outright
rejection of legal advice would not only let law be trumped by politics,
but be paramount to doing something one has been told is illegal. This
means that Straw has to engage with Wood on the legal question. This
6 J Straw, Memorandum on Legal Advice, Supplementary to the Hearing on February 8, 2010,
February 2010, para 13,5http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20171123123957/http://www.
iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/96018/2010-02-XX-Statement-Straw-2.pdf4.
7 See also Henderson in this Symposium.
8 D Kennedy, ‘Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance’ (2005) 27 Sydney
Law Review 5; FG Nuñez-Mietz, ‘Lawyering compliance with international law: Legal advisers in
the “War on Terror”’ (2016) 1 European Journal of International Security 215.
9 Jack Straw, ‘Memorandum on Legal Advice’, para 18.
10 D Kennedy, Of War and Law (OUP 2006); F Kratochwil, The Status of Law in World Society.
Meditations on the Role and Rule of Law (CUP 2014).
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‘upgrades’, rather than ‘downplays’ legal knowledge: it elevates it to a
position not attained by other kinds of expertise and expert advice.
Finally, the permissibility of the use of force ultimately has to be
stated by the Attorney General himself and cannot be Straw’s conclusion
alone. Straw still depends on—and constitutionally needs—the Attorney
General to decide that the legal argument can be made: he has the final
say on the legality of the government’s decision.
If the role of legal advisers and their ‘legal appreciations’ in decision-
making are part of the ‘secret life of international law’,11 the Chilcot
Inquiry provides a unique glimpse into the relationship between law
and politics in foreign policy-making within the UK administration.
However, insightful as this particular case is, it does not allow us to
draw general conclusions on international law in foreign policy, precisely
because of the particularities of different institutional systems, as well as
those of this case.12 What our analysis does reveal is that in order to say
something meaningful about law’s ability to speak truth to power one
needs to engage in micro-level sociological analysis. We show how law is
(re)produced in the exchanges between the Foreign Secretary and his legal
advisers. We elaborate on this argument by investigating three different
‘keys’ in which Straw’s arguments are set. We chose ‘key’ as a (musical)
metaphor as it refers to that which has its own internal logic and range of
possibilities; in our analysis, a particular mode of arguments. Straw makes
use of three different keys: first, the uncertain ‘nature of international
law’13 (section II.A), the negotiating history of Resolution 1441 (section
II.B) and the status of legal advice as such, as well as vis-à-vis policy
advice (section II.C). For each of these keys we can see movements
back and forth, simultaneously downplaying and upgrading the role of
legal knowledge and expertise. In section III we discuss what the
unique look into this hidden and everyday life of international law tells
us about the legal adviser’s capacity to speak law to power, and the rela-
tionship between rule and power in contemporary world society.
11 D Bethlehem, ‘The Secret Life of International Law’ (2012) Cambridge Journal of
International and Comparative Law 1.
12 This is an important caveat as institutional structures and the organisation of the legal office
differ significantly per country, impacting on the process of providing legal advice. See also various
contributions to the special issues on the role of legal advisers in foreign policymaking in (1991) 2
European Journal of International Law; (2005) 23(1) Wisconsin International Law Journal; KM
Manusama, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Providing Legal Advice on Military Action Against
Iraq’ (2012) 42 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 95; M Windsor, ‘Consigliere or
Conscience? The Role of the Government Legal Advisor’ in J d’Aspremont et al (eds),
International Law as a Profession (CUP 2017).
13 Sir Lawrence Freedman uses the same phrase when referring to this part of Straw’s argument.
See the Transcript of evidence given by Ms Elizabeth Wilmshurst, 26 January 2010, 5http://
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20171123123029/http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/95214/
2010-01-26-Transcript-Wilmshurst-S3.pdf4, 8.
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II. THE THREE KEYS OF STRAW’S ARGUMENT
The central legal question in the run up to the decision to invade Iraq
revolved around whether Resolution 1441, read together with UNSC
Resolutions 678 and 687, provided ‘a sufficient basis in international
law to justify military action’ (the so-called revival theory) if ‘Iraq con-
tinues not to comply’.14 While both Sir Michael Wood and Lord
Goldsmith initially argued that Resolution 1441 did not authorise
force, Jack Straw adheres to the revival theory, which was also adopted
by the United States and the Dutch government.15 The starting point of
our analysis is Straw’s ‘I note your advice, but I do not accept it’, which
comes as part of a chain of exchanges between Wood, Goldsmith and
Straw as the main characters in this particular history (November 2002–
February 2003).16 In the following we investigate the ways in which Jack
Straw rejects the legal interpretation set out so unequivocally—at least in
January 2003—by Sir Michael Wood. Rather than sticking to a chrono-
logical order, we use the aforementioned keys to analyse the arguments
put forward by Straw to reject the advice by his legal adviser and to
convince the Attorney General of the proper understanding of UNSC
Resolution 1441: the nature of international law, the negotiating history
of 1441, and the character of legal advice. We show how within each key
there is a simultaneous upgrading and downplaying of legal expertise.
A. The nature of international law
The first key in which Straw sets his argument concerns the nature of
international law. As a first step in his argument, he points out that
international law is by nature more uncertain than domestic law. In
his memorandum to Sir Michael Wood in January 2003, Straw starts
by saying that even in domestic law, legal issues are often uncertain:
‘even on apparently open and shut issues the originators of the advice
offered to me accepted that there could be a different view, honestly and
reasonably held’.17 In his view and ‘experience’,18 if this is the case in
14 Jack Straw to Michael Wood, 29 January 2003, 2.
15 Reviving the ‘all necessary means’ clause of UNSC Res 678. According to Straw ‘there is a
strong case to be made that UNSCR 687, and everything which has happened since (assuming that
Iraq continues not to comply), provides a sufficient basis in international law to justify military
action’. Jack Straw to Michael Wood, 29 January 2003, 2 (emphasis added). See Henderson in
this Symposium.
16 UNSC Res 1441 was adopted on 8 November 2002. Although Tony Blair also plays a crucial
role in the decision-making and Chilcot Inquiry, within the timeframe considered by this article, the
conversation involves first and foremost Straw, Wood and Goldsmith.
17 Jack Straw to Michael Wood, 29 January 2003, 1. It is reminiscent of the Lord Chancellor’s
response to a memorandum drafted by the Law Officers he received during the Suez Crisis, in which
he refers to international law as “dynamic”. See G Marston, ‘Armed Intervention in the 1956 Suez
Canal Crisis: The Legal Advice Tendered to the British Government’ (1988) 37 ICLQ 773, 792.
18 Straw refers here to his own experience with the request for extradition of Pinochet; see Jack
Straw to Michael Wood, 29 January 2003, 1. See also Report, vol 5, Section 5, para 352.
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domestic law, it applies even more strongly to international law, ‘an
uncertain field [with] no international court for resolving such ques-
tions’.19 The question of the legality of force against Iraq in particular,
‘is an arguable one, capable of honestly and reasonably held differences
of view’.20 This honest and reasonable diversity of perspectives is re-
peated throughout the memorandum. In response to a question by
Baroness Usha Prashar during the February 2010 hearings, Straw
refers to these kinds of decisions as being ‘made internally without ex-
ternal determination’; that is to say, made by legal advisers and polit-
icians in the absence of available international courts.21
Straw draws upon this ‘uncertainty’ argument to reject the ‘categorical
nature of the advice’ provided by Wood.22 Given the nature of interna-
tional law, how can Wood be so sure of his rejection of a particular legal
interpretation? Concretely, the specific form this legal uncertainty takes
with regard to Resolution 1441 is well known: contrary to Wood’s un-
equivocal memorandum of 24 January 2003, Straw argues there actually
are ‘two views’23 as to how to interpret Resolution 1441. Indeed, Dutch,
US and Australian legal advisers have ‘take[n] the view that SCR 1441
provides legal sanction for military operations’.24 His substantive dis-
agreement with Wood lies in the fact that, in Straw’s words, ‘this is an
uncertain area of law’.25 At the same time, the uncertain nature or inde-
terminacy of international law surprisingly does not preclude Straw from
identifying Wood’s ‘very categorical statement’ as being ‘frankly . . . on
any analysis, at the time, incorrect’.26 This is confirmed, Straw points
19 Jack Straw to Michael Wood, 29 January 2003, 2. Wood, too, refers to the absence of courts
within the international realm, but draws a different conclusion: ‘[a]s part of giving advice and the
client accepting the advice, the absence of a court, I think, is a reason for being more scrupulous in
adhering to the advice, because it cannot be tested. It is one thing for a lawyer to say, “Well, there is
an argument here. Have a go. A court, a judge, will decide in the end”. It is quite different in the
international system, where that’s usually not the case. You have a duty to the law, a duty to the
system’. Transcript of evidence given by Sir Michael Wood, 26 January 2010,5http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20171123122957/http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/95218/2010-01-26-
Transcript-Wood-S1.pdf4, 34. See also the transcript of evidence given by Sir Michael Wood and
Ms Elizabeth Wilmshurst respectively on this “uncertain nature” of international law; ibid, 33;
Transcript of evidence given by Elizabeth Wilmshurst, 26 January 2010, 8–9.
20 Jack Straw to Michael Wood, 29 January 2003, 2. See also Report, vol 5, Section 5, paras 351–
53. This formulation by Straw—the emphasis on honesty and reason—does suggest criticism of
Wood’s professional ethics in interpreting international law. In his public hearing Wood recalls
Straw telling him that he ‘was being very dogmatic and that international law was pretty vague
and that he wasn’t used to people taking such a firm position’. Transcript of evidence given by Sir
Michael Wood, 26 January 2010, 31.
21 Transcript of evidence given by Jack Straw, 8 February 2010, 26.
22 J Straw, ‘Memorandum on Legal Advice’, para 16.
23 Transcript of evidence given by Jack Straw, 8 February 2010, 3.
24 Jack Straw to Peter Goldsmith, 20 February 2003,5http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.
uk/20171123123643/http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/222617/2003-02-20-minute-straw-to-at-
torney-general-untitled.pdf4.
25 Ibid. The underlining is in the original minutes.
26 Transcript of evidence given by Jack Straw, 8 February 2010, 18. We will return to this in
section II.B below.
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out, by the very fact that Wood himself set out two views in a December
2002 memorandum to Goldsmith.27
Straw’s phraseology here suggests that, in fact, determinate things
may be said of international law; namely that two legal interpretations
may be offered of the same Resolution. It simply cannot be the case that
there is only one legal answer.28 What is more, Straw’s response on
6 February 2003 to Goldsmith’s draft legal advice ends with the claim
that ‘the better interpretation’ is that, given an assessment of ‘material
breach’, ‘(possibly) a further UNMOVIC report’ and a discussion of
these findings in the Security Council, Resolution 1441 ‘revives’ the
authority to use force against Iraq.29 Seemingly to deflect Goldsmith’s
possible argument that this is not necessarily the better interpretation,
Straw adds, ‘[a]t the very least, this interpretation . . . deserves to be
given the same weight as a view which in effect hands [France, Russia
and China] the very legal prize they failed to achieve in the negotiation of
1441’.30
Apparently, this critical legal stance with regard to international law’s
inherent indeterminacy does not preclude Straw from being as categor-
ical as Wood about what international law does and does not allow for
with regard to other legal issues. For example, he is clear on the illegality
of regime change, and on relying on self-defense and humanitarian inter-
vention as grounds for using force against Iraq,31 noting specifically that
‘in some areas . . . international law is very clear’.32 He categorically re-
jects these other grounds as possible justifications for war and in this
regard distances himself from the US legal advisers he previously
invoked as experts on Resolution 1441.33 The US position on regime
change, Straw adds, ‘I regarded as improper and also self-evidently
27 As pointed out by Straw, see eg J Straw, ‘Memorandum on Legal Advice’, paras 15–17. It
should be noted that the point here is not the well-known discussion about the dual role and ‘per-
petual dilemma’ of legal advisers, who need to be both universalist and partisan in their outlook.
That is to say, they need to balance, on the one hand, an objective assessment of the prevailing state
of international law (which could—or should—include the full range of legal views with regard to a
particular issue), with, on the other hand, a more partisan function of being the advocate of their
Ministries’ causes in terms of putting forward the best legal case in support of government policy.
See also AD Watts, ‘International Law and International Relations: United Kingdom Practice’
(1991) 2 EJIL 157, 163. Usually these are presented as two subsequent roles in different phases
of the policy-making process.
28 This does not preclude Straw to argue later on, quite determinately, what the right interpret-
ation of Resolution 1441 is (see section II.B below).
29 Jack Straw to Peter Goldsmith, Iraq: Second Resolution, 6 February 2003,5http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20171123124039/http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/76183/2003-02-06-
Letter-Straw-to-Attorney-General-Iraq-Second-Resolution.pdf4, 5.
30 Ibid (emphasis added). See also Cathy Adams’ views on this, as described in the Report, vol 5,
Section 5, para 117.
31 See, eg, Jack Straw, ‘Memorandum on Legal Advice’, para 8.
32 Transcript of evidence given by Jack Straw, 8 February 2010, 8.
33 Jack Straw to Peter Goldsmith, 20 February 2003.
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unlawful . . . in international law, I am afraid, that is not a good ground
for intervention by other states’.34 These statements about the nature of
international law raise the question why Straw claims legal uncertainty in
this area in the first place. Straw claims on the one hand that interna-
tional law as whole is more uncertain than domestic law, and on the other
hand that ‘some areas [of] international law [are] very clear’.35 In other
words, there are different levels of (un)certainty in different legal (sub-
)fields. Upon closer inspection, however, the claim of uncertainty not
only opens up space for alternative views (including Straw’s own as ‘not
an international lawyer’),36 but also, paradoxically, the possibility that
Wood, as a legal expert, is wrong by misunderstanding the nature of his
own field: to be this categorical in his advice is simply impossible, given
the nature of international law. Straw makes this point unequivocally in
his Memorandum to Goldsmith, dated 6 February 2003, where he
identifies
a paradox in the culture of government lawyers . . . the less certain the law is, the
more certain in their views they become . . . [I]n issues of international law, my
experience is of advice which is more dogmatic, even though the range of reason-
able interpretations is almost always greater than in respect of domestic law.37
This brings Straw to claim, most strongly in the hearings, that Wood was
‘on any analysis, at the time, incorrect, because there was doubt, there was
doubt publicly. There was doubt between international lawyers’.38
Furthermore, identifying this doubt amongst other international lawyers
and opening up the possibility of different ‘honest and reasonable’ inter-
pretations, paves the way for Straw’s argument on the better interpretation
of international law, and the possibility of claiming—in spite of interna-
tional law’s uncertainty in this field—that Wood is wrong on a substantial
level too. This is where the second key comes in. What we see happening
34 Transcript of evidence given by Jack Straw, 21 January 2010, 17; see also Jack Straw,
‘Memorandum on Legal Advice’, para 8.
35 Transcript of evidence given by Jack Straw, 8 February 2010, 8; see also the exchange between
Sir Lawrence Freedman and Elizabeth Wilmshurst during the hearings: Transcript of evidence
given by Elizabeth Wilmshurst, 26 January 2010, 8–9.
36 See Jack Straw, ‘Memorandum on Legal Advice’, para 18.
37 Jack Straw to Peter Goldsmith, 6 February 2003, 2. This in contrast to a perception that
‘[u]nlike the judge, the [legal] adviser is perfectly prepared to admit that legal rules are general
and open-textured and leave much room for policy-choices’. M Koskenniemi, ‘Between
Commitment And Cynicism: Outline For A Theory Of International Law As Practice’ in C
Wickremasinghe (ed), Collection Of Essays By Legal Advisers Of States Advisers Of International
Organizations And In The Field Of International Law (United Nations 1999) 517. When
Koskenniemi subsequently suggests that, from the perspectives of the political colleagues, the ad-
viser is often perceived as typically formalist with a narrow vision on foreign policy, this at face value
seems a direct echo of Straw’s objection. However, as we point out, the engagement here reveals a
more intricate dynamic—not just law versus politics, or legal formalism versus political pragmatism,
but rather an engaged discussion within and about the parameters of law and legal discourse itself.
38 Transcript of evidence given by Jack Straw, 8 February 2010, 18; see also 47: ‘I just happen to
think that [the Attorney General] was correct in regarding the decision that he did come to in the
end as the better view’.
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in Straw’s discussions with Wood and Godsmith, as well as in the 2010
hearings,39 is a shift in argument from legal uncertainty to Straw’s own
involvement in the negotiations of 1441, working in tandem to contest
Wood’s claims.
B. Knowing the law
The second key in which Straw’s argument is set revolves around the
question of the ‘correct’ interpretation of Resolution 1441, and the extent
to which negotiators ‘have a say’ in determining the meaning of these
Resolutions.40 It builds on his ‘considerable knowledge’41 of the nego-
tiating process (and thus meaning) of the Resolution as a ground for
rejecting Wood’s interpretation. The issue here is not so much that a
politician rejects advice: politicians have been known to do so before, and
we will return to this relationship between the politician and the legal
advice he receives in the next section. More interesting is how Straw’s
counterargument works: the fact that he rejects Sir Michael Wood’s legal
advice on substantive grounds. He engages with the substantive legal ar-
gument about the interpretation of Resolutions 687 and 1441, suggesting
that Wood’s straightforward position about the illegality of using force
against Iraq is wrong.
First, Straw claims that the Resolution simply cannot mean what
Wood suggests it means, as it is literally not what the British delegation
bargained. If Wood was right, and Resolution 1441 included the neces-
sity of a second resolution, the ‘negotiations would have been over in a
week’.42 This is echoed in Tony Blair’s evidence before the Inquiry, in
which he clarifies that the ‘instructions to our negotiators’ were to avoid
the suggestion of a second resolution being necessary.43 On the one hand
Straw emphasises the role of negotiations in the production of interna-
tional law, and uses his participation during the negotiations as a basis
for his better view of what it means. On the other hand, he denies that
39 Compare Jack Straw to Michael Wood, 29 January 2003, 2, with Jack Straw to Peter
Goldsmith, 6 February 2003, 2–3, and Transcript of evidence given by Jack Straw, 8 February
2010, 8–9.
40 See also Henderson in this Symposium.
41 Transcript of evidence given by Jack Straw, 8 February 2010, 19. Another example of sub-
stantive engagement with legal advice may again be found in the Suez crisis, see Marston, ‘Armed
Intervention in the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis: The Legal Advice Tendered to the British
Government’, 792–93.
42 Transcript of evidence given by Jack Straw, 8 February 2010, 42. ‘[H]ad we been ready to
embed into the text of 1441 a requirement for a second resolution before any military action’, he
says, ‘negotiations would have been swift and painless’. Jack Straw, Memorandum to the Iraq
Inquiry, January 2010, 5http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20171123122901/http://www.
iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/194013/2010-01-xx-statement-straw-1.pdf4, para 50.
43 Report, vol 5, Section 5, paras 305–306. In the Dutch inquiry by the Davids Commission,
Prime Minister Balkenende makes a similar counterfactual argument (if this is what they meant,
they would have formulated it as such). TE Aalberts, ‘Forging International Order: Inquiring Iraq
in the Netherlands’ (2011) 42 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 139.
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this very fact means that the outcome is always a compromise, that you
never get precisely what you bargained for and texts are often vague
precisely in order to be able to reach an agreement in the first place.
Straw’s argument is based on the part he played in the drafting of the
Resolution, how he ‘was immersed in the line-by-line negotiations of the
Resolution, much of which was conducted capital to capital with P5
Foreign Ministers’.44 He proceeds to detail how the negotiators were
very much aware of the difference between ‘assessed’ and ‘assessment’,
between ‘decide’ and ‘consider’, providing a dictionary definition of the
latter.45 In a supplementary memorandum to the Chilcot hearings in
January 2010, he states: ‘I had become so familiar with the negotiations
on the drafts of 1441, and the final text, that I could almost recite its
terms in my sleep’.46 Similarly, in a subsequent supplementary memo-
randum Straw states he ‘had lived and breathed the negotiation of 1441,
and therefore had an intense appreciation of its negotiating history’.47
Elsewhere, he states how the negotiations between the P5 took place over
‘an extraordinary five-week period in which not just every phrase, but
every word, and even the punctuation, was the subject of the closest
debate and argument . . . In that period I often spent hours each day in
telephone calls with [other Foreign Ministers]’.48 During the hearings,
he explains that his view was based on ‘having been involved in the
negotiations, line by line, word by word, comma by comma’.49
The words Straw uses, both in the hearings themselves as well as in
the supplementary material he provides, are strongly suggestive of this
deeper knowledge of the meaning of Resolution 1441: he talks of its
punctuation, the difference between nouns and verbs (assessment and
assessed), and ‘reciting the terms of 1441 in his sleep’. This is a politician
telling an international lawyer how a Security Council Resolution should
be read for legal purposes.50 It does not suffice to think of Straw’s au-
thority as deriving solely from his being in the political position of
making the actual decision about whether to go to war.51 It also lies in
his claim to ‘know best’ what international law says, based on his in-
44 Jack Straw to Peter Goldsmith, 6 February 2003, 1.
45 Ibid, 3–4.
46 Jack Straw, Memorandum to the Iraq Inquiry, January 2010, para 50. Straw repeats this
(paraphrasing the memorandum) during the hearings: Transcript of evidence given by Jack
Straw, 21 January 2010, 70.
47 Jack Straw, ‘Memorandum on Legal Advice’, para 18.
48 Jack Straw, Memorandum to the Iraq Inquiry, January 2010, para 27.
49 Transcript of evidence given by Jack Straw, 8 February 2010, 13.
50 Though of course, Jack Straw is in fact a lawyer, something pointed out by Sir John Chilcott
during the hearings of Elizabeth Wilmshurst. See Transcript of evidence given by Elizabeth
Wilmshurst, 26 January 2010, 8.
51 See also the distinction between ‘in authority’ and ‘an authority’ discussed in section III
below.
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volvement in and lived experience of the negotiations of Resolution
1441.52 In other words, he moves from a rejection of Wood’s advice
on the basis of the uncertain nature of international law, to its rejection
on the basis of certain, privileged knowledge about its meaning: Straw is
the one who knows what Resolution 1441 truly meant. This is reinforced
by both Straw and Blair’s claim that their interpretation is simply what
the resolution has to mean. Straw’s argument thus goes beyond pointing
out Wood’s erroneous claim to a definitive interpretation of international
law, to claiming that Resolution 1441 can mean only one thing. It is
worth quoting from one of the hearings of Straw in full:
[w]hat I was questioning was the categorical conclusion that he [Sir Michael Wood]
came to. The fact of the matter was that, as of 24 January, I believed—and so did
Sir Jeremy Greenstock and so did Secretary Powell and virtually everybody who
negotiated 1441, including, as it turns out, the French Ambassador to
Washington—that a second resolution would not be required if there were a con-
tinuing material breach by Iraq. I felt that I was entitled to say that.53
This statement reveals a subtle move from rejecting Wood’s statement as
inappropriately categorical (first key) to rejecting it - categorically - as
wrong based on Straw’s certain knowledge of what the law means
(second key). In other words, Straw is not just making a legal-technical
point about him being aware of multiple interpretations being possible.
After opening up the space for multiple interpretations, Straw is now
closing it down by arguing the better interpretation and true meaning of
the Resolution. Crucially, this was not just his individual reading, but a
position shared with many others who were ‘in the room’. This extends
to the other permanent members of the Security Council who ‘knew
what it said and . . . voted for it’.54 In the same move, however, Straw
immediately defers again to the Attorney General: ‘[this] was, of course,
subject to a decision which the Attorney General, and he alone, would
make’, he says ‘[it] was a decision not for us but for the Attorney
General’.55 This brings us to the third and final key in which Straw
sets his argument: the position of legal advice and legal advisers.
52 See also Transcript of evidence given by Jack Straw, 8 February 2010, 20.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid, 41 and see generally 39–45. In his public hearing, Lord Goldsmith makes a similar
statement (if still somewhat cautiously): ‘[i]n one sense, the wording is crystal clear, because these
members of the Security Council, who know the difference between the word “decide” and “con-
sider the situation”, chose, I believe quite deliberately to use the words “consider the situation”, and
they could have said “decide” if that’s what they meant’. Transcript of evidence given by Peter
Goldsmith, 27 January 2010, 5http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20171123123129/http://
www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/235686/2010-01-27-transcript-goldsmith-s1.pdf4, 49.
55 Transcript of evidence given by Jack Straw, 8 February 2010, 20–21.
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C. Status of legal advice
Straw’s experience in negotiating Resolution 1441 is a crucial part of his
disagreement with Wood; at the same time, he claims that the ‘final
decision’ on the law is to be made by the Attorney General. In combin-
ation with the claim made by both Straw and Blair that 1441 could only
have meant one thing the entanglement of arguments appears to be com-
plete. This is about Straw’s own ‘intense knowledge’56 of 1441; yet, he
moves the legal decision very much away from himself. What results is
an extremely elusive argument, difficult to pin down at any one particu-
lar point simply because it constantly shifts back and forth between dif-
ferent modes of argument. In this section, we elaborate on Straw’s
arguments as they pertain to the nature of legal advice, as well as the
position of legal advisers vis-à-vis political decision-makers. As became
clear during the Chilcot hearings, and as Straw himself clarifies, the
discussion between Straw, Wood and Goldsmith is not about whether
a legal adviser may express disagreement with his government.57 It does,
however, bring to the fore the question of the role of legal advisers,58 as
well as the nature of legal advice. This point first emerges from Straw’s
response to Goldsmith, saying he ‘believe[s] that officials should always
offer their best advice’, which does not exclude the possibility of
‘Ministers . . . rais[ing] legitimate questions about the advice they re-
ceive. . . [t]he full range of views ought to be reflected in the advice
offered by our Legal Advisers’.59 Seven years later, in his supplementary
memorandum to the Chilcot Inquiry, Straw added that
[i]t would be wholly improper of any Minister to challenge, or not accept, [the]
Attorney General[’s] decision . . . [b]ut we were not at that stage. It would surely
be a novel, and fundamentally flawed, constitutional doctrine that a Minister
was bound to accept any advice offered to him/her by a Department’s Legal
Adviser . . . if there were reasonable grounds for taking a contrary view.60
As also pointed out by Peevers in her contribution to this Symposium,
Straw at this point presents himself as the ‘authorised decision-maker,
not the legal adviser’.61 Furthermore and crucially, he distinguishes be-
tween the status of legal advice given by the FCO lawyers versus that
provided by the Attorney General. Whereas the first may be rejected, the
56 Ibid, 8.
57 As stated, for example, by Peter Goldsmith, ‘Minute to Jack Straw’, 3 February 2003,5http://
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20171123123358/http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/
218284/2003-02-03-minute-goldsmith-to-foreign-secretary-untitled.pdf4. See also Minute by Jack
Straw to Peter Goldsmith, 20 February 2003.
58 Peter Goldsmith, ‘Minute to Jack Straw’, 3 February 2003.
59 Minute by Jack Straw to Peter Goldsmith, 20 February 2003.
60 Jack Straw, ‘Memorandum on Legal Advice’, para 19. See also Transcript of evidence given by
Jack Straw, February 2010, 6.
61 See Peevers in this Symposium.
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second, as ‘the ultimate and authoritative source of legal advice on inter-
national law [. . .] to the British government’,62 cannot be dismissed. This
brings home the potential impact of the Attorney General advising
against the use of force against Iraq.63 However, as was shown in the
previous section, apparently the FCO advice cannot be rejected outright
either: Straw is engaging substantively with the legal questions involved.
Moreover, as the Chilcot Inquiry reveals, neither does the Attorney
General’s advice need to be accepted at any time or without further
discussion.
With regard to Straw’s intervention with Sir Michael Wood’s advice,
it seems that his substantive engagement with his legal advisers about the
correct interpretation of Resolution 1441 is the only option he has if he
wants to justify the UK’s course of action. To simply ignore the advice
would be tantamount to doing something which he has been told is
illegal: to ignore it is not simply to go against policy advice on, for ex-
ample, health care regulations. It means doing something one is told to
be against the law:
there isn’t any requirement—indeed the government would break down—that
ministers have to accept what amounts in this case to provisional legal advice that
is offered them, any more than you have to accept policy advice. What you have to
be is fully responsible for the decision you make, but I never, ever acted unlaw-
fully at all. I have always been extremely careful about the law, but that cannot
exclude the possibility of having an honest debate with the lawyers. . .64
The above statement suggests that Straw believes legal and policy advice
are the same thing. However, as emphasised above, to ignore or reject
legal advice means to engage in behaviour one has been told is illegal,
which Straw acknowledges to be unfathomable in relation to any advice
given by the Attorney General,65 and which had been set out in a memo-
randum by Wood as being contrary to the UK Ministerial Code.66 In
that light, Straw’s statement that he ‘never, ever acted unlawfully at all’
makes sense: the theoretical possibility to reject legal advice may be
there, but he has to affirm this never happened in practice. Here,
again, we find a similar dynamic as the one described earlier: on the
one hand, Straw downplays the significance of legal advice by equating
it with policy advice; on the other hand, he confirms the special status of
62 Watts, ‘International Law and International Relations’, 159. In this regard, it should also be
noted that the Attorney General and FCO advisers have a different formal position: whereas FCO
advisers are civil servants to the government, the Attorney General formally is a Minister in the
government. The latter thus is a political appointee but is nevertheless supposed to give independent
legal advice (ibid; see also Manusama, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place’, 107).
63 Report, vol 5, Section 5, para 140.
64 Transcript of evidence given by Jack Straw, 8 February 2010, 25 (emphases added).
65 Jack Straw, ‘Memorandum on Legal Advice’, para 19. See also Blair’s comment quoted in the
Report, vol 5, Section 5, para 140.
66 Note Michael Wood, Untitled, 15 October 2002,5http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
20171123122551/http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/76027/2002-10-15-Note-Wood-to-
McDonald-Iraq.pdf4, para 3.
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law by immediately adding that ‘he never acted unlawfully at all’. This
jump between legal advice as merely one type of advice amongst others
to (implicitly) acknowledging its special status is bridged by identifying
particular versions of the legal advice as merely ‘provisional’.67
The constitutional importance of the Attorney General’s advice also
clarifies the importance Straw attaches to the timing of requesting it.
Ultimately Straw still needs the Attorney General to agree with him.
Whereas Lord Goldsmith, from November 2002 onwards, frequently
requests an opportunity to give his advice, he can only provide his initial
view (that the Security Council needs to determine material breach and
needs to authorise the use of force)68 informally.69 Whereas Straw is
interested to hear the Attorney General’s views on the matter,70 this is
not yet a formal request for advice. While on 12 November they agree
that a formal request for advice (‘instructions’)71 would be forwarded,
this does not happen until much later. Remarkably, when instructions
are issued by FCO on 9 December they contain an explicit statement that
‘no advice is required now’ (thus in effect entailing a request not to
advise). Indeed, at several occasions in the subsequent months, including
a meeting on 19 December 2002 with Downing Street officials, it is made
explicit that Lord Goldsmith’s advice is ‘not required now’. When Lord
Goldsmith eventually forwards his advice to Blair on 14 January,72 the
Prime Minister identifies it as being only a draft; there has not been a
formal request yet, hence a formal advice cannot be issued.73 It was not
until 4 February that Lord Goldsmith was asked for ‘urgent advice on a
67 This is technically correct: until there is a formal request, all legal opinions by the Attorney
General are not official and considered provisional Manusama, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place’, 107.
68 Report, vol 5, Section 5, paras 15, 20, 22, 27, 30, 32. See also Michael Wood to Jack Straw,
‘Iraq: Legal Position’, 22 January 2003.
69 Transcript of evidence given by Peter Goldsmith, 27 January 2010, 232 (‘on two occasions I
insisted on offering a view, even though it wasn’t being asked for, to make sure the policy, as it were,
took account of that’).
70 ‘Iraq: Note of telephone conversation between the Foreign Secretary and the Attorney
General’, quoted in Report, vol 5, Section 5, para 13ff, notably para 21. In his testimony to the
Inquiry, Jonathan Powell (chief of staff to the Prime Minister) also distinguishes between written
advice and opinions that Lord Goldsmith expresses. See the Transcript of evidence given by
Jonathan Powell, 18 January 2010, 5http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20171123122841/
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/95166/2010-01-18-Transcript-Powell-S1.pdf4, 103–04.
71 In his testimony Lord Goldsmith explicitly wishes to elaborate on the word “instructions”,
‘because it could be completely misunderstood’. As he explains to the Inquiry, ‘the way that [bar-
risters] work. . . is you get instructions, which means a request to advise [which] comes through with
the detail of the question and with the supporting materials . . . [U]ntil I had had that, particularly
the Foreign Office legal advisers’ point of view, and been able to analyse that, I wasn’t really in a
position to give a definitive point of view’. Transcript of evidence given by Peter Goldsmith, 27
January 2010, 55–56.
72 The advice is in line with Goldsmith’s initial view, ie assessment of material breach by the
Security Council and an explicit authorisation to use force are necessary.
73 ‘I had not yet got to the stage of a formal request for advice and neither had he got to the point
of formally giving it’. Tony Blair’s Statement to the Iraq Inquiry, 14 January 2011,5http://webarc-
hive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20171123123837/http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/229924/2011-
01-14-statement-blair.pdf4, 10. The draft advice was not forwarded to the cabinet.
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second resolution’.74 This is followed by a letter from Straw to the
Attorney General, in which the former again refers the draft status of
the advice of January 14 and asks Goldsmith to ‘carefully consider my
[Straw’s] comments below before coming to a final conclusion’.75 The
delay in the request for Goldsmith’s advice is, of course, one of the most
important points emerging from the Chilcot report.76 Furthermore, fol-
lowing his draft advice (with inconvenient content), it was proposed that
Goldsmith would be presented with ‘alternatives’; he is sent on a field-
trip to United States to meet with UK ambassador Greenstock, as well as
US representatives who were present at the negotiations about
Resolution 1441.77 The well-known result is that by 27 February the
Attorney General declared that a ‘reasonable case’ can be made that a
second resolution would not be necessary.78
* * *
Retracing the process of decision-making and the role of legal advice
within this process brings to the fore a telling discussion about what
the relevant law says in parallel to the development of foreign policy.
While at face value the whole process, and in particular its result, might
seem a clear case of politics trumping law and dethroning the Attorney
General as the highest authority on international law in the UK consti-
tutional system, in the next section we argue that to read this solely as the
instrumentalisation of law to justify politics is too facile a conclusion, and
misses the more intricate dynamics in the production of legal knowledge
as a justificatory practice at play in this case.
III. ‘SPEAKING LAW TO POWER’ AND LEGAL EXPERTS
In this final section, we consider what the Chilcot hearings and Report
reveal about the role and importance of the legal adviser as well as how
legal knowledge—and law itself—is (re)produced in these interactions.
The role of the legal adviser has long been the subject of academic inter-
est. Apart from numerous empirical analyses of their function within
74 Report, vol 5, Section 5, para 416.
75 Jack Straw to Peter Goldsmith, 6 February 2003, also quoted in Report, vol 5, Section 5, para
407.
76 Report, vol 5, Section 5, paras 903–19. In light of all the references to the timing of Lord
Goldsmith’s advice within the final report of the Chilcot Inquiry itself, it is quite surprising the
Inquiry concludes in para 49 that there is ‘no evidence of a discussion about the right timing’ unless
one takes this very literally. In his testimony to the Inquiry, Wood also refers to the ‘reluctance in
some quarters to seek the Attorney’s advice too early’. Transcript of evidence given by Sir Michael
Wood, 26 January 2010, 40. Lord Goldsmith also testified that there had been several occasions
where he had been ‘discouraged from providing’ his advice. Cited in Report, vol 5, Section 5, para
164. Also illustrative are Ms Adams instructions to Lord Goldsmith, as reflected in paras 121 and
240 of the Report, vol 5, Section 5.
77 Report, vol 5, Section 5, para 201.
78 Ibid, para 452–53.
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government and (foreign) policymaking within different domestic con-
texts, more recently there is a growing interest within international legal
theory and International Relations in theorising the role of (legal) ex-
pertise within world society: how has the expansion of international law
and the legalisation of world politics impacted the identity and role of
(legal) experts in global governance?79
Generally, three imaginaries emerge from the literature.80 Are lawyers
an ‘invisible college’ as imagined by Oscar Schachter in the 1970s, as a
distinct and privileged class of a unified international legal profession
with access to a purer kind of knowledge and authority, and with the
‘noblest function’ to give ‘la conscience juridique . . . specific meaning and
effect’, notwithstanding governmental ambivalence?81 Some forty years
later, Martti Koskenniemi painted a very different picture of the inter-
national legal order, as one fragmented into ever more specialised and
technicalised regimes, where there is no unified profession nor a deter-
minate knowledge about the law. Moreover, lawyers are but one of the
parties sitting around the table, and need to defend legal reasoning
against other types of relevant expertise, with different vocabularies
and logics for international decision-making. The disheartening result
is that law invariably defers to the ‘politics of expertise’,82 and the power
of law, as a special kind of expertise, diminishes. Straw’s equation of
legal and policy advice seems reminiscent of such a dynamic. In a
third imaginary, David Kennedy rather suggests that lawyers have
become powerful experts in an increasingly legalised world:
[a]lthough it is easy to think of international affairs as a rolling sea of politics
over which we have managed to throw but a thin net of legal rules, in truth the
situation today is more the reverse. . . . Indeed, to say the world is covered in law
is also to say we are increasingly governed by experts—legal experts.83
In other words, lawyers—including notably government legal advisers—
are among the experts who govern us within world society. The recent
discussion on ‘lawfare’ (the use of law as a weapon, tactical ally or stra-
tegic asset) is only the most outspoken illustration of how law has become
79 See also Windsor in this Symposium.
80 A Leander and T Aalberts, ‘Introduction: The Co-Constitution of Legal Expertise and
International Security’ (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of International Law 783.
81 O Schachter, ‘The Invisible College of International Lawyers’ (1977) 72 Northwestern
University Law Review 217, 225, 226.
82 M Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics’
(2007) 70 Modern Law Review 1, 10 (‘[t]he law defers to the politics of expertise: for what might be
‘reasonable’ for an environmental expert is not what is ‘reasonable’ to a chemical manufacturer; what
is ‘optimal’ to [a] development engineer is not what is optimal to the representative of an indigenous
population; what is ‘proportionate’ to a humanitarian specialist is not necessarily what is propor-
tionate to a military expert’).
83 Kennedy, ‘Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance’ (emphasis added), 5
See also WG Werner, ‘The Politics of Expertise: Applying paradoxes of scientific expertise to
international law’ in M Ambrus et al (eds), The Role of Experts in International Decision-Making:
Advisors, Decision-Makers or Irrelevant? (CUP 2014) pp 44-62.
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an integrated part of world politics, a sine qua non for doing and justifying
foreign policies and politics.84 It is precisely international law’s appear-
ance of objectivity that makes it such a powerful tool for the pursuit and
legitimation of political objectives.85 This imaginary suggests that law
itself has become an instrument of war; that is to say, an instrument to
legitimise the use of force in spite of its prohibition as one of the corner-
stones of the international legal order.86 Formulated like that, it seems
that the third imaginary best captures the UK decision-making with
regard to the war on Iraq in 2003.
At the same time, the picture of being governed by legal experts, and
the conception of lawyerisation as the structural empowerment of legal
advisers in the policymaking process,87 fails to capture the dual dynamics
of upgrading/downgrading of legal expertise we identified above: as a
special kind of expert knowledge on the one hand, and just one kind of
expert knowledge, on the other. Moreover, these views on the role of law
and lawyers seem to suggest that legal knowledge is something produced
by the legal expert (ie FCO Legal Adviser Wood and/or Attorney
General Goldsmith) and presented to the client (identified by Lord
Goldsmith as Prime Minister Blair)88 as a full package, which the
latter can either accept or reject. This brings to mind the famous anec-
dote of Madeleine Albright suggesting to Robin Cook ‘to get new law-
yers’, ones who would tell her that a unilateral intervention in Kosovo
would be legal.89 Whereas Straw is also explicit in not accepting the legal
advice he is presented with, this is only the start of what becomes an
extensive discussion about the substance and character of the law, which
not only pushes at the boundaries of law, but also raises questions as to
who in fact is the legal expert and who can participate in producing that
specific ‘expert’ kind of legal knowledge. As such, the Chilcot Inquiry
does indeed provide a unique insight into the work done by FCO legal
advisers and the Attorney General, as well as into the nature, limits and
contestability of (their) legal expertise.
The legalisation of world politics for certain means that governments
need to be able to justify their foreign policy making—and in particular
decisions of high politics such as the waging of war—to be in accordance
84 Kennedy, Of War and Law; WG Werner, ‘The Curious Career of Lawfare’ (2010) 43 Case
Western Reserve Journal of International Law 61; P Vennesson and NM Rajkovic, ‘The
Transnational Politics of Warfare Accountability: Human Rights Watch versus the Israel Defense
Forces’ (2012) 26 International Relations 409; S Ranganathan, Strategically Created Treaty Conflicts
and the Politics of International Law (CUP 2014).
85 SV Scott, International Law in World Politics. An Introduction (Lynne Rienner 2010) ch 7.
86 Kennedy, Of War and Law.
87 Nuñez-Mietz, ‘Lawyering compliance with international law’.
88 Transcript of evidence given by Peter Goldsmith, 27 January 2010, 67. In his public hearing a
year later, Lord Turnbull objects to this narrowing of the clientele to the Prime Minister only, as
this ‘isn’t a very good description of the importance of this advice’. Transcript of evidence given by
Lord Turnbull, 25 January 2011, 5http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20171123122522/
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/234680/2011-01-25-transcript-turnbull-s2.pdf4, 28.
89 J Rubin, ‘Countdown to a Very Personal War’ Financial Times (30 September 2000).
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with international law. By entering into the juridical field, governments
have to accept ‘the specific requirements of the juridical construction of
the issue’.90 This requires not only knowledge of the rules (know-what)
but also the skills for engaging in legal argumentation (know-how). Yet
within this framework it is entirely possibly to impact both the legal
interpretation and framing of a particular issue as well as to organise
political practices so as to avoid liability.91 Indeed, it is a hallmark of a
good lawyer that she can provide a valid legal argument for either pos-
ition in a dispute.92 In this context it is not so extraordinary that Wood
(is asked to) provide(s) different views on the necessity of obtaining a
second resolution. Legal practice in general, and providing legal advice
to the government in particular, can be conceived as a lawyerly ‘craft’, a
term that nicely encompasses both the element of skilled use, the art or
professional practice of doing law, and the element of legal strategising.93
Within the framework of ‘lawfare’ and the discussion about ‘lawyering
up’, government legal advisers become the crucial intermediaries in this
interplay between politics and international law. In addition to highlight-
ing the ‘politics of international law’, as well as foreign policy-making and
international law as intermeshed practices rather than separate domains,
this literature still assumes quite distinct roles for the people involved in
this process. What is interesting about the Chilcot Inquiry is that it reveals
how the status of legal knowledge and the role of the legal adviser varies
throughout the discussion. Rather than just receiving, accepting and/or
rejecting legal advice, Straw is actively entering into the juridical field
through the three keys we identified. To paraphrase Koskenniemi, the
Foreign Secretary has to ‘commit’ himself to international law and the
technicalities of legal discourse in order for law to deliver its seal of legit-
imacy on political decisions as the cynical flipside of the power of law.94
This requires, on the one hand, the lawyerly craft of developing the right
legal argument. The craft can be executed by Straw as a non-interna-
tional-lawyer too, or so he argues. One does not need to be an interna-
tional lawyer to know what international law says or to understand how it
is made and argued. Anyone who knows the rules of the game can provide
90 P Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field’ (1987) 38 Hastings
Law Journal 805, 831.
91 T Aalberts and T Gammeltoft-Hansen, ‘Sovereignty Games, International Law and Politics’
in T Aalberts and T Gammeltoft-Hansen (eds), The Changing Practices of International Law (CUP
2018).
92 As explained, for example, by Scott, International Law in World Politics. An Introduction, 138,
fn 9.
93 I Mann, ‘The Disaggregated Law of Global Mass Surveillance’ in T Aalberts and T
Gammeltoft-Hansen (eds), The Changing Practices of International Law (CUP 2018), 146.
94 This tension between commitment and cynicism in the work of legal advisers is insightfully
discussed by Koskenniemi, ‘Between Commitment And Cynicism’, While he identifies these quali-
fications with different perspectives (legal scholars versus political colleagues) on what legal advisers
do, as inside and outside perspectives, we shift the focus to the Foreign Secretary and argue that a
similar dynamic ‘between commitment and cynicism’ is at play in this case. Straw needs to take the
legal game seriously in order for it to function as a legitimizing force for his foreign policy.






/bybil/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/bybil/bry016/5108485 by Vrije U
niversiteit Am
sterdam
 user on 13 June 2019
an ‘honest and reasonable’ legal argument, ie be an expert (‘an authority’)
on international law. On the other hand, not everyone gets to say defini-
tively (authoritatively) ‘what the law is’. While Straw can provide an
expert opinion on the true meaning of Resolution 1441, as the Foreign
Secretary he cannot rely on this very knowledge and expertise for the
justification of his own foreign policy decisions. Straw needs the
Attorney General to voice it from his position as an external legal author-
ity, more specifically, as ‘the ultimate and authoritative source of legal
advice on international law . . . to the British government’ for law to do
its justificatory job.95 Thus, after securing that the legal advice has the
right content, Straw needs someone ‘in authority’ to seal it off.96
IV. CONCLUSION
We began this chapter with Straw’s infamous ‘I note your advice, but
I do not accept it’. We have shown that it is too facile a conclusion to
dismiss this as simply a matter of politics (a politician) trumping law
(dismissing a lawyer). Rather, the image that emerges from the docu-
ments released by the Chilcot Inquiry is far more nuanced, complex and
interesting. Straw bases his rejection on three arguments: first, he argues
the uncertain nature of international law. Here, Straw states that inter-
national law on the use of force is more indeterminate than other areas of
international law; hence, so is legal interpretation in this field. Moreover,
Straw disagrees with Wood on the interpretation of Resolution 1441, for
two reasons: first, Straw himself headed the negotiations on the UK side,
and therefore has ‘insider knowledge’ of what it means. Secondly, the
Resolution simply cannot mean what Wood says it does, because the UK
negotiating team explicitly opposed such an outcome. The third and final
dimension of Straw’s argument pertains to the status of legal advice: on
the hand, he states that a Foreign Minister is not bound to accept FCO
lawyers’ advice; on the other, he explicitly says that ‘he never acted un-
lawfully at all’. Straw thus takes himself in and out of the equation – in
and out of the invisible college – when it comes to the legal advice that he
is given. In one respect, this suggests that international lawyers are not
the only ones eligible to be experts (‘an authority’) on international law.
Others can provide equally valid—honest and reasonable—arguments, if
they know the rules of the ‘legal game’. Those in power cannot function
without legal truth, but who is/can be a legal expert to produce it is
95 Watts, ‘International Law and International Relations’, 159. As the Davids Committee also
notes, the role of the Attorney General in the course of the events changed from an independent
legal adviser to an advocate for the government. Rapport Commissie van Onderzoek Besluitvorming
Irak, Mr WJM Davids (chair), Boom Amsterdam (2010), 264.
96 The distinction being ‘in authority’ vs being ‘an authority’ comes from RB Friedman, ‘On the
Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy’ in J Raz (ed), Authority (New York University Press
1990) 56–91.
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apparently less a matter of roles or education. In that sense, this entire
episode could be read as that it is relatively easy to defeat lawyers on their
own turf: others may even have better access to the meaning of the law, if
they have lived the experience of its production. Based on his inside
knowledge, Straw is able to ultimately get the legal advice he needs.
This could lead to a very cynical view on law as handmaiden of politics.
But there is more to it than just instrumentalism, as these documents also
confirm the special status of law by the players involved. Time and again
the importance of getting the green light from the relevant lawyers is
confirmed; sometimes more, sometimes less explicitly so. After all, the
Attorney General still needs to seal it off, and hence he needs to be
persuaded of another reading of the law. Moreover, the controversy
and public outcry surrounding the decision to invade Iraq suggests
that the malleability of international law perhaps only goes so far.97
Even though one may speak the ‘language’ of international law, there
are limits to what can be sold as ‘an honest and reasonable’ legal argu-
ment.98 The resignation of Elizabeth Wilmshurst, and her declaration
that she ‘[could] not in conscience go along with advice. . . which asserts
the legitimacy of military action’99, should be read in that light. One can
wonder, though, whether this ‘reasonableness’ of legal arguments is a
quality inherent to international law itself, or whether it is decided by
those engaged in the field.100 ‘Speaking the law’—juris dicere101—is ul-
timately reserved to those in a position to do so.
97 See also Peevers in this Symposium, who describes how Elizabeth Wilmshurst received a
‘standing ovation’ after her testimony to the Chilcot Inquiry.
98 In the context of the US torture memos, this is reminiscent of the ‘permissible good-faith
argument’, see RB Bilder and DF Vagts, ‘Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and Torture’ (2004) 98
AJIL 689, 694.
99 E Wilmshurst, ‘Wilmshurst Resignation Letter’ BBC News (24 March 2005)5http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4377605.stm4. For a discussion, see also S Samuel, ‘British Influences
on the “Ideals” of International Lawyers’ in R McCorquodale and J–P Gauci (eds), British
Influences on International Law, 1915–2015 (Brill Nijhof 2016) 84–85.
100 See also T Aalberts and I Venzke, ‘Moving Beyond Interdisciplinary Turf Wars: Towards an
Understanding of International Law as Practice’ in J d’Aspremont et al (eds), International Law as a
Profession (CUP 2017) pp 287–10.
101 P Goodrich, ‘Disciplines and Jurisdictions: An Historical Note’ (2010) 48 English Language
Notes 153, 154, 155; G Noll, ‘Theorizing Jurisdiction’ in A Orford, F Hoffmann and M Clark (eds),
The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law (OUP 2017) 608, and section 4 of his
chapter in general.






/bybil/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/bybil/bry016/5108485 by Vrije U
niversiteit Am
sterdam
 user on 13 June 2019
